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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD
Some Legal Aspects Of The Colorado Coal Strike
By EDWARD MILLER, Esq., of the Denver Bar
ON October 18, 1927, about one-half of the coal miners of the
largest coal companies in the
Trinidad and Walsenburg districts in
the southern part of the State of Colo-
rado went on strike. The State Indus-
trial Commission took the position, and
probably properly so, that the strike
was illegal, basing its decision on sub-
stantial irregularities in the petition
addressed to it asking increased wages
and a change in working conditions in
all of the coal mines of the State. The
notice was filed September 6, 1927, and
was signed by six men, who, according
to a positive statement of the office of
the Attorney General in a letter to the
Industrial Commission, were not em-
ployees of the coal companies whose
miners went on strike; furthermore
the commission states that it "was
unable to find a single delegate" at a
conference previously held at Aguilar
"who was elected by his fellow workers
in a meeting assembled for that pur-
pose". Accordingly, the commission
ruled that the strike notice was void
and the strike illegal, as to all em-
ployees who had failed to give the stat-
utory. notice signed by themselves or
by a committee authorized for such
purpose. C. L. '21. Sec. 4353. "Em-
ployers and employees shall give to
the Industrial Commission and the one
to the other at least thirty days' prior
written notice of an intended change
affecting conditions of employment or
with respect to wages or hours." * * *
"Notice by said employees shall be
signed by said employees or members
of a committee of said employees au-
thorized for such purpose."
The persuasive measure of picketing
was then employed and numerous
arrests followed, culminating on No-
vember 7th with the arrest of about
fifteen individuals who were supposed-
ly the non-resident I. W. W. leaders of
the strike. They were immediately
incarcerated and according to the
newspaper reports, held incommuni-
cado, and without bond.
These latter arrests were made by
special officers of the State Law En-
forcement Department appointed by
the Governor, a department which was
originally intended for the enforce-
ment of the State Prohibition Act. 0.
L. '21, Section 3723. "The Governor
of the State shall compel the enforce-
ment of all provisions of this act (the
Intoxicating Liquor Act of 1915), and
for this purpose he may call upon any
State, District, County, precinct or mu-
nicipal officer, or he may appoint such
agents as necessity may require * * *"
This section was construed by the
Colorado Supreme Court in the case
of Lee v. Morley, 79 Colo. 4181 in which
case the Court was called upon to de-
clare invalid an executive order of the
Governor abolishing the law enforce-
ment department. The Court said,
page 484: "The heart of this dispute
lies in the phrase 'he (the Governor)
may appoint such agents as necessity
may require'. The filling of the office
or offices thus created was left to the
discretion of the Governor and he was
made the sole judge of the necessity."
But in 1918, this department came
under the Civil Service Amendment to
the Constitution, (Sec. 13, Art. XII, p.
66, C. L. '21), and with respect to that
the Court says, page 484: "By the
terms of the civil service amendment
such agents, if appointed, come under
its provisions. If the Governor deter-
mines that ten are necessary, they
will be selected as the amendment
provides. If, in his opinion, the emer-
gency passes and only one is required
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the rules of the commission will deter-
mine which one. If, however, the Gov-
ernor reaches the conclusion that none
is necessary no question of selection
is presented and all must go. The dis-
cretion of the Governor to determine
the necessity, under such provisions
as the one here in question was settled
in People, et al. v. Milliken, 74 Colo.
456, 458; 223 Pac. 10." There is, how-
ever, in the Rules and Regulations of
the State Civil Commission a provision
authorizing provisional and emergency
appointments by the appointing power,
until such time as the Commission
shall give an examination and com-
plete an eligible list. A number of the
men serving in the strike area had pre-
viously passed the civil service exam-
ination and were on the eligible list for
appointments.
Almost immediately after the arrest
of the leaders a large number of min-
ers went back to work so that on
November 9th the numbers working
in the Trinidad and Walsenburg Dis-
tricts totaled approximately seventy
per centum of the number employed on
October 15th.
A picture of the evolution of labor
law lends an interesting background
for a view of the Colorado situation.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in the case of Truax vs. Cor-
rigan, 257 U. S. 321, gives an interest-
ing review, which is so comprehensive
as to justify_ extensive quotation:
"In England up until 1813 a work-
ingman struggling to improve his con-
dition even when acting singly was
confronted with laws limiting the
amount of wages which he might de-
mand. Until 1824 he was punishable
as a criminal if he combined with his
fellow workmen to raise wages or
shorten hours or to affect the business
in any way even if there was no resort
to a strike. In 1871, members of a
union who joined in persuading em-
ployees to leave work were liable crim-
inally, although the employees were
not under contract and the persuasion
was both peaceful and unattended by
picketing. Until 1871, threatening a
strike, whatever the cause, was also
a criminal act. Not until 1875 was the
right of workers to combine in order
to attain their ends conceded fully. In
that year Parliament declared that
workmen combining in furtherance of
a trade dispute should not be indict-
able for criminal conspiracy unless the
act, if done by one person, would be
indictable as a crime * * *. But pick-
eting, though peaceful, in aid of a
strike remained illegal; and likewise
the boycott. It was not until 1906 that
the ban on peaceful picketing and the
bringing of pressure upon an employ-
er by means of a secondary strike or
a boycott was removed * * * In Eng-
land the improvement of conditions of
workingmen and their emancipation
appear to have been deemed recently
the paramount public need."
"In the United States the rules of the
common law governing the struggle
between employer and employee have
likewise been subjected to modifica-
tion. These have been made mainly
through judicial decisions. The legal
right of working men to combine to
strike in order to secure for them-
selves higher wages, shorter hours
and better working conditions receiv-
ed early general recognition. But
there developed great diversity of opin-
ion as to the means by which and also
as to the persons through whom and
upon whom pressure might permissi-
bly be exerted in order to induce the
employer to yield to the demands of
the working men. Courts were re-
quired, in the absence of legislation,
to determine what the public welfare
demanded; whether it would not be
best subserved by leaving the contest-
ants free to resort to any means not
involving a breach of the peace or in-
jury to tangible property; whether it
was consistent with the public inter-
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est that the contestants should be per-
mitted to invoke the aid of others not
directly interested in the matter in
controversy; and to what extent inci-
dental injury to persons not parties
to the controversy should be held jus-
tifiable."
"The earliest reported American de-
cision on peaceful picketing appears to
have been rendered in 1888 but the
doctrine was not established until
eight years later in the case of Vege-
lahn vs. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92. By no
great majority the prevailing public
opinion in American inclines towards
the legality of peaceful picketing. See
American Steel Foundries vs. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 1841.
In some of the States, notably New
York, both peaceful picketing and the
boycott are declared permissible * * *
Judges, being thus called upon to ex-
ercise a quasi-legislative function and
weigh relative social values, naturally
differed in their conclusions on such
questions."
There then evolved in this country
such a tremendous use of the injunc-
tion in labor disputes as to cause con-
siderable criticism concerning the
abuse of the injunction. The contro-
versy over the remedy overshadowed
in bitterness the question of the rela-
tive substantive rights of the parties.
Thoughtful lawyers throughout the
land deplored the innovation of "gov-
ernment by injunction," which, it was
asserted, endangered the personal lib-
erty of wage earners. If the injunc-
tion were violated, the charges were
heard before the judge issuing the in-
junction, without a jury, often upon
affidavit only, and without the oppor-
tunity of confronting or cross-examin-
ing witnesses. Men found guilty of
contempt were committed in the
judge's discretion without either a stat-
utory limit upon the length of the im-
prisonment or the opportunity of effec-
tive review on appeal, or the right to
release on bail pending possible re-
visory proceedings. In effect the pro-
ceedings were criminal except that the
individual was denied the usual consti-
tutional safeguards and privileges in
criminal proceedings.
That was the juristic conception in
1905 when the Colorado Legislature
passed a statute providing in effect
that picketing should be unlawful, and
that the violation of the statute should
be deemed a misdemeanor subject to
a fine of not less than $10.00 nor more
than $250.00, or imprisonment in the
County Jail not to exceed sixty days,
or both, in the discretion of the Court.
C. L. '21, Sections 4162 and 166.
The following constitutional provi-
sions are also relevant: Colorado Con-
stitution, Article II, Section, 10, Free-
dom of Speech: "That no law shall
be passed impairing the freedom of
speech; that every person shall be free
to speak, write, or publish whatever
he will on any subject, being responsi-
ble for all abuses of that privilege * *
•". Colorado Constitution, Article II,
Section 19: "That all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties except
for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident or the presumption great".
The act of 1915, as amended, relating
to labor disputes between employers
and employees provides, as indicated
above, for notice, and the opportunity
of investigation and arbitration by the
State Industrial Commission of the
causes of dispute between the employ-
er and employee. Should the employ-
ees strike without such notice or the
employer cause a lockout without
notice then ,it is legislatively declared
that an injunction may issue main-
taining all conditions in statu quo un-
til the dispute is investigated by the
Commission and a final decision made
by the Commission; with the proviso
that "nothing in this Act shall pro-
hibit the suspension or discontinuance
* * * of any industry or of the work-
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ings of any person therein which in-
dustry is not affected with a public
interest." The employer guilty of a
lockout is subject to a fine of not more
than One Thousand Dollars or six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day of such lock-
out constitutes a separate offense. The
employee guilty of striking contrary
to the provisions of the act is subject
to a fine of not more than $50.00 or
imprisonment for not more than six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day constitutes
a separate offense. Another important
criminal section of the same act pro-
vides that any person who incites, en-
courages or aids in any manner any
employee to go or continue on strike
contrary to the act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be subject to a
fine of not more than One Thousand
Dollars, or imprisonment for not more
than six months in the county jail, or
both.
The injunctive section of this act
(Section 30) was construed in the case
of People v. United Mine Workers of
America, 70 Colo. 269. where the con-
stitutionality of the statute was ques-
tioned, but sustained by the Supreme
Court. The Court said, at page 271:
"Unless coal mining may be said to be
affected with a'public interest its regu-
lation by statute to the extent attempt-
ed by said chapter is unconstitutional.
The words 'affected with a public inter-
est' were no doubt used by the Gen-
eral Assembly to keep the statute with-
in constitutional limits. It becomes
necessary, then, not only in order to
construe the statute but to decide
whether it is constitutional, to deter-
mine whether coal mining is so affect-
ed; and it seems self-evident that it is.
We must take judicial notice of what
has taken place in this and other
States and that the coal industry is
vitally related not only to all other in-
dustries but to the health and even the
life of the people. Food, shelter and
heat, before all others, are the great
necessities of life, and in modern life,
heat means coal."
In the case of American ,iteel Foun-
dries v. Tri-City Central Trades Coun-
cil, 257 U. S. 193, at page 202, the court
construed Section 20 of the Clayton
Act of October 15, 1914, which provided
"That no restraining order or injunc-
tion shall be granted by any Court of
the United States in any case between
an employer and employees * * * in-
volving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right, of the party making
the application * * *". Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Taft says: "It is clear that Con-
gress wished to forbid the use by the
Federal Courts of their equity arm to
prevent peaceable persuasion by em-
ployees, discharged or expectant, in
promotion of their side of the dispute,
and to secure them against judicial re-
straint in obtaining or communicating
information in any place where they
might lawfully be. This introluces no
new principle into the equity jurispru-
dence of those Courts. It is merely
declaratory of what was the best prac-
tice always. Congress thought it wise
to stabilize the rule of action and ren-
der it uniform."
"We are a social people, and the ac-
costing by one of another in an inoffen-
sive way and an offer by one to com-
municate and discuss information with
a view to influencing the other's ac-
tion, are not regarded as aggression
or a violation of that other's rights.
If, however, the offer is declined, as it
may rightfully be, then persistence,
importunity, following and dogging,
become unjustifiable annoyance and ob-
struction which is likely soon to savor
of intimidation."
On the same day that this case was
finally argued before the United States
Supreme Court, the case of Truax v.
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Corrigan, Supra, was also finally
argued. In that case, by a five to four
decision, a statute of the State of Ari-
zona, similar in import and intention
and almost identical in language, with
that of Section 20 of the Clayton Act
was under discussion. But there the
Court held that the State had exceeded
its sovereign authority by depriving
an owner of a business of his prop-
erty without due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Mr. Chief Justice Taft said
there, at page 340 "We held in Ameri-
can Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council
that under these clauses picketing was
unlawful, and that it might be enjoin-
ed as such, and that peaceful picketing
was a contradiction in terms which the
statute sedulously avoided, but that,
subject to the primary right of the
employer and his employees and would
be employees to free access to his
premises, without obstruction by vio-
lence, intimidation, annoyance, impor-
tunity or dogging, it was lawful for ex-
employees on a strike and their fel-
lows in a labor union to have a single
representative at each entrance to the
plant of the employer to announce the
strike and peaceably to persuade the
employees and would-be employees to
join them in it. We held that these
clauses were merely declaratory of
what had always been the law and the
best practice in equity, and we thus
applied them. The construction put
upon the same words by the Arizona
Supreme Court makes those clauses of
Section 1464 (the Arizona statute) as
far from those of Section 20 of the
Clayton Act in meaning as if they were
in wholly different language."
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting said:
"There is nothing that I more depre-
cate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute com-
pulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an
important part of the community de-
s-res, in the insulated chambers afford-
ed by the several States."
In this 'insulated chamber' known
as the sovereign State of Colorado, at
the time of the commencement of the
strike we had taken the position that
picketing was illegal and that striking
without notice was illegal. In respect
to picketing, Colorado was committed
to the same policy as the States of New
Jersey, Minnesota and Pennsylvania.
It has been suggested that because
of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Wolff
Packing Company v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations of the State of Kansas,
267 U. S. 552, that Court might declare
the Colorado Act unconstitutional as
being an attempt at compulsory arbi-
tration, and hence a deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law. Such
a conclusion, is doubtful, since the
Colorado act is, at most, an attempt to
induce voluntary arbitration, and to
stay the strike temporarily. The re-
cent pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of Dorchy v. Kansas,
272 U. S. 306, that "neither the common
law nor the Fourteenth Amendment
confers an absolute right to strike," is
important in that connection.
In this jurisdiction there were sev-
eral lines of statutory procedure which
could have been followed. Assuming
that the employees had not given prop-
er notice of the strike, the State upon
proper warrant could have arrested all
pickets and all strikers subject, how-
ever, to the right of the pickets and
strikers to bond and an early trial.
The State also had the right to injunc-
tive relief maintaining the status quo
between employer and employee, in ad-
dition to the right to arrest any indi-
vidual inciting, encouraging, or aiding
in the strike, subject, however, to the
right of such defendants to bond and
an early trial.
No injunction issued. Some pickets
were arrested and released on bond but
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the strike was unimpaired. A truce
was agreed on between the strikers
and the Governor, embodying the ces-
sation of picketing. The truce was
short-lived and picketing was resumed.
The Governor then appointed special
officers acting as the law enforcement
department to enforce the anti-picket-
ing statute. This group, acting in con-
junction with local officers, arrested
every known leader of the I. W. W. en-
couraging the strike, placed them in
jail, and held them without bail. The
effect was readily apparent. Without
leadership the strikers in the southern
fields began to return to work. On
November 10th a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus was filed in the
United States District Court at Den-
ver on behalf of the prisoners but up
until November 18th the defendants
were still in jail and no step farther
toward the goal of freedom, except
that it then became known that
charges had been filed against the de-
fendants and that it was possible for
them to secure their release on bond.
The habeas corpus proceedings were
then dismissed on motion of the peti-
tioners.
In the southern field it was a condi-
tion somewhat analogous to that de-
scribed in the case of In re Debs, 158 U.
S. 5611, 597, quoting from the testimony
of one of the defendants before the
United States Strike Commission: "As
soon as the employees found that we
were arrested and taken from the
scene of action they became demoraliz-
ed and that ended the strike. It was
not the soldiers that ended the strike;
it was not the old brotherhoods that
ended the strike. Our men were in a
position that never would have been
shaken under any circumstances if we
had been permitted to remain upon the
field among them. Once we were taken
from the scene of action and restrained
from sending telegrams or issuing or-
ders or answering questions, * * * our
headquarters were temporarily demor-
alized and abandoned and we could not
answer any messages. The men went
back to work and the ranks were
broken and the strike was broken-
not by the army, and not by any other
power, but simply and solely by the
action of the United States courts in
restraining us from discharging our
duties as officers and representatives
of our employees."
We have sought to give an unbiased
review of the legal and illegal steps
taken in the strike. It is only through
the constant and impartial mainten-
ance of the constitutional rights of all
men, employers and employees, rich
and poor, that we can hope to preserve
the just faith in a constitutional form
of government. Might never made
right, although it has often disguised
itself in that cloak, to be later exposed
and disgraced as an imposter.
Recent Trial Court
Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It is intended In each
issue of the Record to note interesting
current decisions of all local Trial Courts,
including the United States District Court,
State District Courts, the County Court,
and the Justice Courts. The co-operation
of the members of the Bar is solicited in
making this department a success. Any
attorney having knowledge of such a de-
cision is requested to phone or mail the
title of the case to Victor Arthur Miller,
who will digest the decision for this de-
partment. The names of the Courts hav-
ing no material for the current month will
be omitted, due to lack of space.)
DIVISION 5
JUDGE CHARLES SACKMAN
People vs. Painless Parker Dentist
Facts: Quo warranto to obtain writ
of ouster against the defendant, a Cali-
fornia corporation, doing business in
Denver to prevent it from practising
dentistry through employees and agents
who are duly licensed in this state.
The corporation has not and cannot
get a license to practice dentistry.
